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Undergraduate Thesis

From Grievance to the Ballot Box:
Economic and Cultural Drivers of Far-Right Voting in Europe (2000- 2024)

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Athens, May 2026

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Konstantinos Roumanias, for his guidance, patience, and invaluable feedback throughout the development of this thesis. His expertise and his willingness to engage with my questions at every stage shaped this work in fundamental ways. Whatever merit this thesis may have owes a great deal to his supervision.

Abstract

This thesis examines the demand-side determinants of far-right voting across 271 NUTS 2 regions in 27 European countries between 2000 and 2024, distinguishing throughout between two subfamilies of the far-right party family: the Populist Radical Right (PRR), and the Extreme Right (ER). Two distinct mobilisation mechanisms emerge. PRR support is driven by cultural threat and relative deprivation, captured by immigration flows and income inequality; ER support is driven by economic hardship, captured by unemployment. Immigration flows have a stronger effect than immigration stocks across both subfamilies, consistent with the salience-of-change hypothesis. The 2015 refugee crisis constitutes a genuine structural break, with asymmetric effects across the two subfamilies and across regions. The determinants of far-right voting differ sharply between Eastern and Western Europe: in the West, far-right mobilisation operates through conventional economic channels, while in the East it operates primarily through cultural and distributional channels, with immigration producing disproportionate political reactions. The empirical strategy addresses two challenges that have constrained earlier work. Approximately 18% of PRR observations and 68% of ER observations take the value zero, a censoring pattern that produces biased estimates in standard linear models; this thesis employs the semiparametric panel Tobit fixed effects estimator developed by Honoré (1992), which combines pairwise differencing of regional fixed effects with appropriate treatment of left-censored vote shares. In addition, the regional level of analysis captures the substantial subnational variation in far-right support that national-level studies obscure. These findings carry direct implications for European immigration and labour market policy, which should be calibrated to regional context rather than applied uniformly across the continent.

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1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, the far right has moved from the margins of European politics into the political mainstream. Parties that once occupied the fringes of national debate now sit in coalition governments, set policy agendas, and shape public discourse on immigration, identity, and the welfare state. The Sweden Democrats, once treated as untouchable, now provide parliamentary support to the Swedish government. Italy is led by a prime minister from a party with neo-fascist roots. France's Rassemblement National routinely finishes ahead of every other party in European elections. Hungary and Poland have been governed by far-right or far-right-adjacent parties for the better part of a decade. The pattern is no longer episodic, but structural.

On the demand side, this electoral transformation has generated a substantial scholarly literature attempting to explain why voters turn to the far right. Two broad families of explanations dominate. The first, often associated with Inglehart and Norris (2016), frames far-right support as a cultural backlash, an electoral response to immigration, value change, and the perceived erosion of traditional national identity. The second, with roots in Jackman and Volpert (1996) and Golder (2003), treats far-right voting primarily as a symptom of economic insecurity, where unemployment, deindustrialization, and exposure to globalization push voters toward radical alternatives. These two accounts are typically presented as competing explanations, but recent work suggests they may be complementary, with cultural and economic anxieties reinforcing one another in ways that produce particularly intense far-right mobilization (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Georgiadou et al., 2018).

Many studies treat the far-right as a single, homogenous category, despite well-established distinctions between two main subfamilies: The Populist Radical Right (PRR) and the Extreme Right (ER)[1]. This thesis demonstrates how vital this distinction is, in order to understand the mechanisms that drive the far-right vote. In addition, most existing work focuses on national level data, which ignores the substantial sub-national variation of the far-right support. This is why this thesis uses regional level analysis.

[1] A full list of abbreviations and party names used throughout this thesis is provided in Appendix D

This work also makes distinctions between the time periods before and after the 2015 refugee crisis, as well as between Eastern and Western Europe. These are vital in deepening our understanding of how the far-right operates under different conditions, and therefore make more informed decisions when targeting a specific country or region at a specific time period.

I examine 27 European countries, 271 NUTS 2 regions, and 25 years (2000 to 2024). The empirical framework builds directly on Georgiadou et al. (2018), extending their analysis to a longer time period, a larger geographic coverage, and an updated party classification based largely on PopuList 3.0 (Rooduijn et al., 2024), Mudde (2007) and Georgiadou et al. (2018), while also testing more hypotheses.

The empirical findings can be summarised in four points. First, the PRR and ER are driven by fundamentally different mechanisms: PRR mobilization reflects cultural threat and relative deprivation, captured by immigration flows and income inequality, while ER mobilization reflects absolute economic hardship, captured by unemployment. Second, immigration flows have a stronger effect than immigration stocks. Third, the 2015 refugee crisis represents a genuine structural break, with asymmetric effects across the two subfamilies and across regions. This is a temporal break. Fourth, the determinants of far-right voting differ sharply between Eastern and Western Europe. In the West, far-right mobilization operates through conventional economic channels. In the East, it operates primarily through cultural and distributional channels, with immigration producing disproportionate political reactions even at low baseline levels. This is a geographical break.

Beyond the academic interest, understanding what drives voters toward the far right has serious policy implications, with real political and socioeconomic consequences. When mainstream parties misread the sources of far-right support, they tend to respond with the wrong tools. Treating an economic grievance as a cultural one, or vice versa, produces policies that fail to address the underlying anxieties of the voters they are trying to reach, and often deepens the very alienation that fuels far-right mobilisation in the first place. The stakes are not abstract. The far right's rise has already reshaped European politics on questions of asylum, civil rights, the rule of law, and the future of European integration, and continues to do so. Knowing who votes for these

parties, in which regions, and why is therefore not only an empirical question but a precondition for any serious democratic response. This thesis aims to contribute to that effort.

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

2.1 Demand-side explanations of the far-right vote

The literature on the electoral rise of far-right (FR) parties often distinguishes between demand-side and supply-side explanations (Mudde, 2007). The demand-side refers to the conditions that push voters toward the far right, such as unemployment, immigration and inequality, all of which constitute what Mudde calls the "breeding ground" for far-right politics. The supply-side, on the other hand, converts that demand into actual electoral outcomes through party organization and political competition (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). In this sense, far-right support functions much like a market for a consumable good: its emergence requires both a consumer willing to buy and a producer able to deliver. This thesis focuses on the demand-side, i.e. the socioeconomic and structural conditions that generate voter demand for far-right parties, rather than the organizational or strategic characteristics of the parties themselves.

2.2 The far-right party family: PRR and ER as distinct subfamilies

Following Mudde (2007), the literature distinguishes two subfamilies within the broader far-right party family, based on their relationship to democracy and their distance from historical fascism. Extreme right (ER) parties are ideologically rooted in the fascist tradition and reject fundamental democratic principles (Mudde, 2007, p. 31), whereas populist radical right parties (PRR) challenge the political establishment and promote nativism, authoritarianism and populism within the democratic system. This sub-family distinction holds across both Western and Eastern Europe, although Pirro (2015) demonstrates that Central and Eastern European populist radical right parties, while sharing the core nativist-populist features of their Western counterparts, constitute a distinct phenomenon shaped by post-communist legacies, ethnic minority politics, and different patterns of party competition.

2.3 Economic grievances and the far-right vote

The central claim of this thesis is that a direct link exists between economic hardship and electoral extremism. Deteriorating economic conditions and the insecurity they create among

voters increase demand for far-right parties (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Since economic insecurity is not directly measurable, unemployment rates play a vital role in estimating it, occupying a central position in this framework not only because of the personal conditions of the jobless, but also because of the anxiety this socioeconomic signal places on the employed, who fear losing the security that a steady paycheck provides (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; King et al., 2008). However, the strength of this relationship is not beyond doubt. Arzheimer (2009), for example, finds that while unemployment has a statistically significant effect on far-right voting in Western Europe, it is not because of its political relevance, but rather, because of the levels of immigration and welfare generosity in a given context. For this reason interaction terms are also tested in Section 2.5.

2.4 Cultural backlash and the far-right vote

When discussing political choices, one must take into account not only the economic conditions of voters, but also the cultural context. Far-right voters are not always victims of poverty or unemployment, but of their own fears and anxieties about the world around them, which make them more susceptible to far-right rhetoric. This also explains why, in some instances, regions with higher GDP per capita can be positively associated with far-right vote shares (Georgiadou et al., 2018). In this framework, immigration is the central mechanism. It functions not as a purely demographic phenomenon but as a perceived threat to national identity and cultural cohesion, generating demand for parties that promise to protect national interests and restrict immigration (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Halla, Wagner & Zweimüller (2017)).

2.5 When economic and cultural threats intersect

Economic and cultural threats do not operate independently. Where unemployment is high, the effect of immigration on voters' decisions is expected to be stronger. Symmetrically, citizens of a region with major inflows of immigrants, are expected to be more easily influenced by unemployment rates. This interaction has been confirmed empirically at the local level by Coffé et al. (2007), who find that Vlaams Blok's electoral success in Belgium was concentrated in areas combining economic deprivation with high immigrant presence.

This thesis tests the interaction between unemployment and immigration directly, through the inclusion of interaction terms in the baseline specification (Section 4.2).

2.6 Salience-of-change and contact hypotheses

As far as the role of immigration is concerned, literature distinguishes between sudden inflows of immigration, which, according the "salience-of-change" hypothesis (Newman and Velez, 2014; Blumer, H. 1958; Hopkins, D.J. 2010), are more likely to cause the demonisation of immigration, and prolonged co-habitation, which, according to the "contact hypothesis" (Kaufmann, 2017; Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L.R. 2006), provides natives with the opportunity to interact with the immigrant population, which improves their attitudes toward it.

This thesis focuses on the former, as sudden changes in the levels of immigration are the most likely to cause shocks in the community, which create environments that foster nationalist and xenophobic tendencies and become the breeding ground for right-wing extremism.

2.7 The 2015 refugee crisis as a structural break

After examining the effects of immigration on the far-right vote, this thesis examines the 2015 refugee crisis, as it was a period of unprecedented inflows across the continent within a short time period, and therefore constitutes a major cultural shock, that is expected to increase support for the far-right (Hangartner et al., 2019; Dinas et al., 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva & Damm 2019; Steinmayr, A. (2021)). This is tested empirically through the use of a post-2015 dummy variable and its interaction with other variables in Section 4.2

2.8 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, the following hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 1. (Economic Insecurity):
Regions with higher unemployment rates are expected to produce higher vote shares for both PRR and ER parties.

Unemployment rates serve as the primary indicator of regional economic insecurity in this analysis, which identifies economic insecurity as a central mechanism driving support for the far right (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Golder, 2003).

Hypothesis 2. (Cultural Backlash):
Regions with higher levels of immigration are expected to produce higher vote shares for both PRR and ER parties.

Support for the far right is not driven solely by economic factors. The cultural backlash thesis identifies immigration as a perceived threat to national identity and cultural cohesion, generating demand for parties that promise restrictive immigration policies and the protection of national interests (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Georgiadou et al., 2018).

Hypothesis 3. (Interactions):
The effects of unemployment and immigration on the far-right vote are mutually reinforcing. Each is expected to be stronger in the presence of the other.

Economic and cultural threats do not operate separately. In periods of high unemployment, the fear caused by an inflow of immigrants is reinforced by the insecurity caused by the economic instability. Symmetrically, in periods of high levels of immigration, the effect of unemployment becomes stronger.

Hypothesis 4. (Inequality):
Higher levels of income inequality increase support for PRR parties, but not for ER parties.

The populist radical right relies on perceived unfairness and pushes anti-elite rhetoric in order to appeal to those experiencing a sense of relative deprivation, while the extreme right ideology accepts the hierarchical social structures as natural (Georgiadou et al., 2018; Han 2016).

Hypothesis 5. (Structural break):
The 2015 refugee crisis is expected to have created a level shift in FR support.

The European refugee crisis of 2015 was, as its name suggests, a period of increased immigration flows throughout the continent, and therefore an important cultural shock for European voters, who, based on the existing literature, are expected to react by shifting toward the far-right vote, as the crisis dominated public discourse and provided far-right parties with a powerful mobilization tool (Hangartner et al., 2019; Dinas et al., 2019).

Hypothesis 6. (East-West asymmetry):
The determinants of far-right voting differ from Eastern to Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, immigration levels are significantly lower than in the West, yet far-right parties still manage to mobilize voters around the immigration issue, indicating that, in Eastern Europe, exposure to immigration is not necessary to create a narrative that paints immigration as a threat, while in Western Europe, this narrative is more closely tied with the presence of immigrant communities (Georgiadou et al., 2018). This East-West divergence is also emphasised by Minkenberg (2017), who argues that the Eastern European radical right constitutes a phenomenon sui generis, shaped by the legacies of the post-communist transition and an unfinished process of nation-building, and is consequently both organisationally more fluid and ideologically more extreme than its Western counterpart.

3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data sources and sample

This analysis uses regional-level data, drawing on a panel dataset of national parliamentary elections from 27 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. The dataset comprises 271 NUTS 2 regions and 1,573 region-election observations.

These data were obtained from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA), with the exception of the Netherlands, for which data were drawn from the European Parliament Election Database (EU-NED), as it was not included in the CLEA dataset. Constituency-level results were aggregated to the NUTS 2 level through manual mapping, and parties were classified as populist radical right (PRR) or extreme right (ER) following Mudde (2007) and PopuList 3.0 (Rooduijn et al., 2024), in line with the classification used by Georgiadou et al. (2018). A full list of parties and their classification is provided in Appendix A.

The regional socioeconomic data used to construct the explanatory variables were obtained from Eurostat; a detailed description of these variables can be found in Section 3.2.

3.2 Variables[2]

The dependent variables are the shares of votes for PRR and ER parties as a percentage of total valid votes in each NUTS 2 region. The socioeconomic covariates include Unemployment, Long-term unemployment, GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, Immigration (flow and stock), Eastern dummy (a time-invariant binary variable equal to 1 for Eastern European countries) and Post-2015 dummy (a binary variable equal to 1 for election years from 2016 onward, capturing the structural break associated with the European refugee crisis). Summary statistics are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
PRR vote share (%)	1,573	10.38	13.33	0.00	81.44
ER vote share (%)	1,573	0.83	2.24	0.00	29.46
Unemployment rate (%)	1,355	8.07	5.42	1.70	34.00
Long-term unemployment rate (%)	1,205	3.95	3.65	0.30	21.70
GDP per capita (PPS index)	1,149	93.12	36.54	18.00	252.00
Gini coefficient	1,562	31.98	3.07	23.70	40.40
Immigration flow (% of pop.)	1,555	0.80	0.41	0.02	2.60
Immigration stock (% of pop.)	1,555	6.38	3.81	0.11	23.74
Eastern dummy	1,573	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Post-2015 dummy	1,573	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00

Notes: Election-year observations only (maximum N = 1,573). 271 NUTS 2 regions, 27 countries, 2000-2024. N varies across variables due to missing values.

3.3 Estimation method

Approximately 18% of PRR observations and 68% of ER observations take the value of zero. It is impossible to know exactly what these zeros mean. They could be genuine zeros, meaning that no voter in the region supported the far right, or they could reflect censored negative values, meaning that the underlying demand for the far right was in fact negative but, since there cannot be negative votes, this still appears as zero. In that case, a region may experience a substantial

[2] The selection of socioeconomic covariates draws on Georgiadou, Rori & Roumanias (2018), Gidron & Hall (2017), Gest, Reny & Mayer (2018), Golder (2003), Arzheimer (2009), Inglehart & Norris (2016), Hangartner et al. (2019) and Dinas et al. (2019)

increase in demand for the far right below the censoring threshold without this being reflected in the data. This censoring pattern produces biased estimates and motivates the choice of the Tobit estimator.

The Tobit model was first introduced by Tobin (1958) and surveyed comprehensively by Amemiya (1984), and quickly became standard for addressing censoring, but it cannot easily accommodate panel fixed effects. In a linear model, adding a dummy variable for each region is straightforward. In a Tobit model, however, each additional fixed effect introduces estimation error that does not cancel out as the sample grows, but rather, it accumulates, a problem known as the "incidental parameters problem" (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Greene, 2004; Wooldridge, 2010). In this case, a standard Tobit model would produce unreliable coefficients, due to the large number of regions in relation to the limited number of elections per region.

In this thesis, this problem is addressed through the use of the Honoré estimator (Honoré, 1992). For each region, instead of estimating the fixed effect, Honoré takes every possible pair of two elections (e.g. 2000 and 2004, 2000 and 2008, 2000 and 2012, etc.) and looks at the change in vote shares relative to the change in each explanatory variable. When a change occurs below the censoring threshold (e.g. the real increase in demand is from -10% to -5% but the vote shares go from 0% to 0%) the estimator ignores these pairs, because it cannot properly derive information from them. The “trimmed” estimator only takes into consideration usable information (e.g. a change in which at least one value is positive).

In an attempt to illustrate the importance of accounting for the censoring, Table 2 compares the coefficients estimated by the Honoré estimator and a standard linear fixed effects model (LFE). The contrast is substantial. LFE estimates are dramatically attenuated toward zero, with the most extreme divergence for log GDP per capita on PRR (13.89 vs 0.22, a more than sixtyfold difference) and a sixfold gap for immigration flow on ER (5.04 vs 0.83). For variables with limited within-region variation, the LFE bias toward zero is severe enough to obscure mobilising channels that the Honoré estimator identifies as substantively important.

Table 2: Honoré vs LFE

	PRR		ER	
	Baseline Honoré	Baseline LFE	Baseline Honoré	Baseline LFE
Unemployment	0.2347*	0.0231	0.5077***	0.1381***
	(0.1281)	(0.0804)	(0.0884)	(0.0344)
GDP per capita (log)	13.8852	0.2187	14.6451***	3.9897***
	(8.7521)	(4.0676)	(3.6221)	(1.0458)
Gini	1.959*	0.819*	-0.3054**	-0.2383***
	(1.0524)	(0.4633)	(0.1416)	(0.0557)
Immigration	15.8087***	8.6302***	5.0381***	0.8299***
Flow (%)	(4.0391)	(1.6232)	(1.2744)	(0.2042)
Observations	1082	1082	1082	1082
NUTS2 Regions	206	206	206	206

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Honoré: Bootstrap SE (B=199), Panel Tobit FE.
LFE: HC1 robust SE, linear within estimator. Eastern dummy absorbed by within transformation in LFE.

The Honoré estimator computes standard errors (SEs) with the use of nonparametric cluster bootstrap with 199 repetitions, which means that SEs are computed by re-estimating the model 199 times, each time on a different random sample of regions drawn with replacement, and taking the standard deviation of the resulting coefficients.

The baseline specification takes the form:

$$\text{VoteShare}_{it} = a_i + \beta_1 \text{Unemp}_{it} + \beta_2 \log(\text{GDPpc}_{it}) + \beta_3 \text{Gini}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{ImmigFlow}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where VoteShare_{it} denotes PRR and ER vote share in NUTS2 region i in election year t, a_i is the region-specific fixed effects, Unemp_{it} is the region's unemployment rate in year t, $\log(\text{GDPpc}_{it})$ is the region's gross domestic product per capita, Gini_{it} is the gini coefficient, which measures inequality, ImmigFlow_{it} is the immigration flow as a percentage of the population and ε_{it} is the error term. This equation is estimated using the Honoré (1992) semiparametric panel Tobit estimator, which eliminates the region-specific fixed effects through pairwise differencing. The resulting coefficients capture the effect of each independent variable on the latent demand for far-right parties.

Subsequent specifications extend this baseline by progressively adding the following interaction terms[3]: $Unemp_{it}xImmigFlow_{it}$, $Unemp_{it}xGini_{it}$, $Unemp_{it}xEastern_{i}$, where Eastern is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when region i is in Eastern Europe, as well as a post-2015 dummy capturing the structural break associated with the 2015 refugee crisis.

3.4 Descriptive statistics

Figure 1 plots the average European PRR and ER vote share over 25 years (2000 - 2024). The ER vote remains relatively low and steady throughout the years, fluctuating between 0% and 3%, while the PRR vote shows a clear upward trend.

Figure 2 presents the average far-right vote share by country. Poland, Hungary and Slovenia record the highest combined far-right vote shares, driven almost entirely by PRR parties. The ER vote (shown in light grey) is visible in only a handful of countries, most notably Serbia, Slovakia and Poland, and remains a small fraction of the total far-right vote in all cases. The chart also highlights the prominence of Eastern European countries at the top of the ranking, consistent with the East-West asymmetry explored in Hypothesis 6, in Section 2.8.

[3] Throughout the specifications, I interact modifying economic indicators with the unemployment rate rather than with immigration. Unemployment is the primary economic stressor; the other indicators condition its political salience. Interacting them with immigration would conflate the cultural-threat and absolute-deprivation channels this thesis aims to keep separate.




Figure 1: *Average European PRR and ER vote share, 2000-2024.*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA, EU-NED and Eurostat data.*




Figure 2*: Average far-right vote share by country, 2000-2024.*
Source*: Author's calculations based on CLEA and EU-NED electoral data.*

4. Results[4]

4.1 Regression Results

Table 3 and Table 4 present the results of the Honoré (1992) panel Tobit fixed effects estimator for the PRR and ER vote shares respectively, testing Hypotheses 1,2,3,4 and 6 (Hypothesis 5 is tested separately in Section 4.2). In each table, Column (1) is the baseline specification, which includes unemployment rate, log(GDP per capita), the Gini coefficient, and immigration flow as a percentage of the country's total population. Column (2) adds the Unemployment x Immigration Flow interaction, testing Hypothesis 3, according to which these two variables are expected to reinforce each other. Column (3) replaces immigration flow with stock in both the level and interaction term. Column (4) adds the Unemployment x Gini interaction to the baseline, testing how the effect of economic hardship changes as inequality rises and vice versa. Column (5) adds the Eastern dummy and its interaction with unemployment to the baseline, testing whether the effect of unemployment on far-right voting differs between Eastern and Western Europe. Column (6) replaces unemployment with long-term unemployment and interacts it with immigration flow, testing whether chronic labor market exclusion operates differently from short-term unemployment. Column (7) adds the Eastern dummy and its interaction with immigration flow, testing whether immigration has a stronger effect on far-right voting in Eastern Europe.

[4] Results are robust to leave-one-out country exclusion; see Appendix

Table 3: PRR Vote Share[5]

	(1) Baseline	(2) Unemp x Flow	(3) Unemp x Stock	(4) Unemp x Gini	(5) Unemp x East	(6) LTU x Flow	(7) East x Flow
Unemployment	0.2347*	0.3814**	-0.5983*	-8.2192***	0.4427***		0.1728
	(0.1349)	(0.1661)	(0.3319)	(1.0928)	(0.1031)		(0.1209)
GDP per capita (log)	13.8852	14.1289	4.7134	6.68	8.082	15.5087	-13.8915**
	(9.5208)	(8.6562)	(9.1883)	(9.7926)	(8.1718)	(9.5137)	(6.7534)
Gini	1.959*	1.8934**	1.2869	0.0087	2.1769**	1.7664	2.1313**
	(1.0729)	(0.9627)	(1.0607)	(0.895)	(1.0338)	(1.1099)	(0.8318)
Immigration Flow (%)	15.8087***	18.5825***		15.4862***	14.9408***	20.4868***	9.4097***
	(3.8504)	(4.7726)		(3.4397)	(3.5533)	(4.7633)	(1.5887)
Unemployment x Immigration Flow		-0.2939*					
		(0.1676)					
Immigration Stock (%)			0.4479				
			(0.3449)				
Unemployment x Immigration Stock			0.07*				
			(0.038)				
Unemployment x Gini				0.2445***			
				(0.0307)			
Eastern Dummy					0		0
					(0)		(0)
Unemployment x Eastern					-0.7348***		
					(0.2095)		
Long Term Unemployment						0.9439***	
						(0.2241)	
Long Term Unemployment x Immigration Flow						-0.7639***	
						(0.2869)	
Eastern x Immigration Flow							30.8354***
							(8.6452)
Observations	1082	1082	1082	1082	1082	984	1082
NUTS2 Regions	206	206	206	206	206	197	206
Pairs	2574	2574	2574	2574	2574	2221	2574
% Zeros	21.9%	21.9%	21.9%	21.9%	21.9%	21%	21.9%

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199). Honore (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

[5] The estimation sample is reduced from 1,573 to 1,082 observations due to missing values on the socioeconomic covariates, primarily log GDP per capita (424 missing) and the unemployment rate (218 missing).

Table 4: ER Vote Share

	(1) Baseline	(2) Unemp x Flow	(3) Unemp x Stock	(4) Unemp x Gini	(5) Unemp x East	(6) LTU x Flow	(7) East x Flow
Unemployment	0.5077***	0.0816	-0.6557***	-2.0811***	0.5002***		0.1873***
	(0.0923)	(0.1215)	(0.1127)	(0.516)	(0.074)		(0.0273)
GDP per capita (log)	14.6451***	16.8257***	5.2371	10.7809***	6.3139*	15.6318***	-4.343***
	(3.6018)	(3.7382)	(3.8497)	(3.8752)	(3.37)	(4.1871)	(1.3579)
Gini	-0.3054**	-0.0938	0.3838***	-0.8696***	0.5183***	0.2395**	0.7689***
	(0.1482)	(0.1163)	(0.1222)	(0.2355)	(0.1204)	(0.1137)	(0.0921)
Immigration Flow (%)	5.0381***	-4.0368***		4.2441***	2.0938**	-2.6001**	-1.2619***
	(1.3407)	(1.2248)		(1.3046)	(0.9568)	(1.2607)	(0.2989)
Unemployment x Immigration Flow		0.9326***					
		(0.1582)					
Immigration Stock (%)			-1.0668***				
			(0.1398)				
Unemployment x Immigration Stock			0.1372***				
			(0.0102)				
Unemployment x Gini				0.0728***			
				(0.015)			
Eastern Dummy					0		0
					(0)		(0)
Unemployment x Eastern					-1.042***		
					(0.0744)		
Long Term Unemployment						-0.0074	
						(0.2118)	
Long Term Unemployment x Immigration Flow						1.1791***	
						(0.3307)	
Eastern x Immigration Flow							25.606***
							(1.3522)
Observations	1082	1082	1082	1082	1082	984	1082
NUTS2 Regions	206	206	206	206	206	197	206
Pairs	2574	2574	2574	2574	2574	2221	2574
% Zeros	65.9%	65.9%	65.9%	65.9%	65.9%	64.7%	65.9%

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199). Honore (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

The baseline model (Column(1)) reveals the main drivers for each subfamily of the far-right vote. For the PRR vote (Table 3), the most statistically significant variable and clear dominant determinant is immigration flow, with a large, positive coefficient of 15.8087, reflecting that even small increases in immigration flows, which, in this sample, rarely exceed 2.6% of the population (see Table 1) , are associated with substantial increases in PRR vote shares. For the ER vote (Table 4), the picture is fundamentally different. Unemployment is positive and statistically significant, which confirms Hypothesis 1, albeit only partially, as it is insignificant for the PRR. Immigration flow is once again positive and significant, as expected in Hypothesis 2. The PRR immigration coefficient is roughly three times larger than the ER, which is consistent with the theory that PRR vote shares are more affected by immigration. The Gini coefficient does not reach statistical significance for the PRR vote, while for the ER vote, it is negative and significant, confirming that ER parties do not benefit from rising inequality, also consistent with this thesis' hypothesis. Finally, log(GDP per capita) is positive and significant for the ER. At first glance this may appear odd, as more affluent regions are not expected to be extremist, but keeping in mind that the Honoré estimator controls for time-invariant regional characteristics, this coefficient captures within-region changes, therefore its correct interpretation is: ER support rises when a region becomes richer relative to itself, consistent with the observation in Georgiadou et al. (2018) that far-right support is not simply a product of poverty but can emerge in growing regions where certain groups feel left behind.

In Column (2), the Unemployment x Immigration Flow interaction is introduced, testing Hypothesis 3. The interaction term is positive and significant for the ER vote share but negative and not significant for the PRR. This confirms the hypothesis for the ER but not for the PRR. For the PRR, immigration appears to operate as a cultural threat independently of labor market conditions, as the addition of the interaction term only affects the other coefficients. Unemployment and the Gini coefficient gain significance. For the ER, unemployment and the Gini coefficient lose significance, while immigration flow changes sign and becomes negative, suggesting that once the interaction is accounted for, the baseline effect of immigration on the ER is absorbed by its interplay with unemployment.

In Column (3), immigration flow and its interaction term are replaced with stock, both as a robustness check and a test for salience-of-change and contact hypotheses (Newman and Velez,

2014; Kaufmann, 2017). For the PRR, neither immigration stock nor its interaction with unemployment are statistically significant, reinforcing the finding that it is the rate of change in immigration, not the accumulated level, that drives PRR support. For the ER, both the stock variable and its interaction with unemployment are significant, though their coefficients are considerably smaller than their flow counterparts. This is consistent with the salience-of-change hypothesis (Newman and Velez, 2014).

In Column (4), the Unemployment x Gini interaction is added to the baseline model, and it is statistically significant in both tables, meaning that unemployment and inequality reinforce each other's effects on both subfamilies of the far-right vote.

In Columns (5) and (7), the eastern dummy is introduced, in accordance with Hypothesis 6. The Unemployment x Eastern interaction is negative and significant for both PRR and ER, indicating that unemployment is a weaker driver of far-right voting in Eastern Europe. The Eastern x Immigration Flow interaction is positive and significant for both PRR and ER, indicating that immigration flows have a disproportionately strong effect in Eastern European regions. These results confirm this thesis' hypothesis, that far-right mobilization in Eastern Europe operates primarily through cultural channels, while in Western Europe it is more closely tied to labour market conditions. It should also be noted that the Eastern dummy by itself, being a time-invariant variable, returns a coefficient of zero, as it is eliminated by the pairwise differencing procedure, but its interactions with time-varying covariates, however, are identified and estimated. The interaction coefficient captures the differential within-region effect of the time-varying covariate in Eastern relative to Western regions, with identification of the interaction coming exclusively from within-region variation in Eastern Europe.

Column (6) replaces the unemployment rate with long-term unemployment as another robustness check. The results reveal an important distinction. For the PRR, long-term unemployment is positive and significant, but its interaction with immigration flow is negative and significant. For the ER, the pattern is reversed: long-term unemployment is not significant on its own, but its interaction with immigration flow is positive and significant.

4.2 The 2015 refugee crisis as a structural break

The first regression for testing Hypothesis 5 adds a post-2015 dummy and its interaction with immigration flow to the baseline model (Table 5).

Table 5: Immigration x Post-2015

	(1) PRR	(2) ER
Unemployment	0.1955	0.4003***
	(0.1346)	(0.0837)
GDP per capita (log)	8.6839	7.4485*
	(8.4204)	(3.8522)
Gini	2.1263*	-0.251**
	(1.1215)	(0.1154)
Immigration Flow (%)	16.891***	8.3733***
	(5.8428)	(2.8847)
post2015	8.4995**	5.5339***
	(3.925)	(1.4914)
immig_x_post	-6.3573	-8.422***
	(4.4807)	(2.5264)
Observations	1082	1082
NUTS2 Regions	206	206
Pairs	2574	2574

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199).
Honoré (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

The dummy variable is statistically significant for both the ER and the PRR , but the interaction term is only significant for the ER, while the other coefficients, despite some small changes, retain their significance (or lack thereof) as well as their signs.

Expanding further, Table 6 adds post2015 interactions with every variable used in the baseline model (except log(GDP pc)). While Table 5 isolates the immigration channel, Table 6 allows the break to operate through multiple pathways simultaneously. Log GDP per capita is excluded from the interactions because it functions in the model as a level control for regional development rather than a politically salient driver of far-right support, and interacting it with post-2015 would introduce a hard-to-interpret term without clear theoretical grounding.

Table 6: Full structural break

	(1) PRR	(2) ER
Unemployment Rate	0.2021	0.364***
	(0.1597)	(0.1053)
GDP pc (log)	7.6956	10.2466**
	(9.0243)	(4.6364)
Gini	3.3245***	0.1799
	(1.1194)	(0.2233)
Immigration Flow (%)	22.2668***	8.843***
	(5.7536)	(2.7935)
post2015	89.0734***	13.6706
	(24.2423)	(11.5958)
immig_x_post	-13.328**	-6.8493**
	(5.1979)	(2.7006)
unemp_x_post	0.1029	0.1176**
	(0.0977)	(0.0537)
gini_x_post	-2.4929***	-0.3794
	(0.7225)	(0.3422)
Observations	927	927
NUTS2 Regions	196	196
Pairs	1985	1985
Wald p-value[6]	0.0002	0.0002

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199).
Honoré (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

For the ER, in this model (Table 6), the gini coefficient and the post2015 dummy lose their significance, while log(GDP pc) gains significance. The interaction term immig_x_post is significant and negative, unemp_x_post is significant and positive and gini_x_post is not significant at all. This means that after the 2015 refugee crisis, an increase in immigration flow decreased the ER vote share, while unemployment continues to drive the ER vote relatively unbothered. For the PRR, Gini becomes significant and the post2015 dummy, not only continues to be significant, but its coefficient becomes 10 times larger than in Table 5. The term immig_x_post is significant and negative, just like for the ER, while gini_x_post is also significant and negative and unemp_x_post is neither. From that, it can be deduced that the 2015 refugee crisis, affected the way voters experience inequality.

A joint Wald test is added to the full structural break specification to assess whether the 2015 refugee crisis constitutes a genuine break in the determinants of far-right support. The test

[6] In order to formally test for a structural break, the Wald test is incorporated to show that the two regimes are different.

evaluates the null hypothesis that the post-2015 dummy and its three interaction terms (with immigration flow, unemployment, and the Gini coefficient) are jointly equal to zero. Unlike the individual t-statistics reported in the table, which assess each coefficient separately, the Wald test asks whether the post-2015 terms matter collectively, which is the appropriate way to evaluate whether a structural break exists. A small p-value indicates that the relationship between the explanatory variables and far-right vote shares changed significantly around 2015, justifying the inclusion of the break in the model. The test is reported only for the full break specification because that is the specification designed to capture the structural change in its entirety; the simpler interaction models in Table 3 and Table 4 do not test for a temporal break and therefore do not call for a joint test of post-2015 terms.

For additional analysis, the sample is split into two subgroups: one for the time periods 2000-2014 and one for 2015-2024. The coefficients presented in Table 7 are the results of running the baseline model twice: once for each of the aforementioned subgroups. This allows for the direct comparison of the coefficients across these two time periods, which is very useful when trying to determine how the event that occurred between those time periods affected the coefficients and the variables' explanatory power.

Table 7: Time split

	Pre-2015		Post-2015	
	PRR	ER	PRR	ER
Unemployment Rate	-0.0054	0.2082*	0.3412*	0.5458***
	(0.2106)	(0.1074)	(0.2005)	(0.0817)
GDP pc (log)	-1.1768	10.9331*	-12.1521	13.6059***
	(9.0819)	(5.6776)	(16.2716)	(4.6242)
Gini	3.619**	1.1301***	1.4647***	-1.3168***
	(1.4641)	(0.316)	(0.4509)	(0.1393)
Immigration Flow (%)	4.9748	7.2745***	11.4047***	-3.6914***
	(5.382)	(2.4609)	(1.0649)	(1.1602)
Observations	678	678	358	358
NUTS2 Regions	180	180	141	141
Pairs	1031	1031	316	316

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199).
Honoré (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

The most notable result in Table 7 for the PRR is the increase in significance of the Immigration Flow (%), while for the ER, there are many impactful changes. Both the unemployment rate and the GDP pc (log) are insignificant before 2015 but significant after, and while the significance of

inequality and immigration doesn't change, their coefficients have positive signs before 2015, and negative signs after. The drivers of the ER were affected much more than those of the PRR.

This is interesting, because the 2015 refugee crisis is, at its core, a cultural one, and it has been the main argument and consistent result in this thesis, that the PRR vote is a response to cultural threats, while the ER is a response to economic hardship. But, the PRR had always been driven by cultural factors, so a cultural crisis would not change its drivers. It would (and did), however, change the ER vote drivers, by adding a cultural dimension to what had previously been a predominantly economic insecurity vote.

4.3 East vs West asymmetry

Following Georgiadou et al. (2018), who test for structural differences between Eastern and Western Europe and identify differentiated mechanisms between the two country groups, and having already introduced the Eastern dummy and some of its effects in Table 3 and Table 4 another split I created, this time between Eastern and Western Europe, comparing the coefficients of the PRR and the ER of each geographic sub-group, in order to further compare how the drivers of the far right operate in each of them.

Table 8: Geographic split with temporal interaction

	Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	PRR	ER	PRR	ER
Unemployment Rate	0.596***	0.1619***	-0.112	-0.0396
	(0.1173)	(0.0508)	(0.2152)	(0.1087)
GDP pc (log)	9.0693**	-10.7647***	-56.8528***	33.6544***
	(4.4776)	(2.5372)	(18.9124)	(6.108)
Gini	0.3722	0.6231***	4.0433***	-0.2911
	(0.5915)	(0.1078)	(1.375)	(0.2195)
Immigration Flow (%)	1.3906	-0.1300	52.2217***	12.6209***
	(1.6868)	(0.3817)	(19.0469)	(3.5488)
post2015	-8.4415***	0.9007	27.4886**	0.0148
	(1.8228)	(0.6451)	(12.3923)	(1.2765)
Immigration Flow (%) x post2015	10.1078***	-2.5255***	-25.9464*	-18.267***
	(1.5902)	(0.8852)	(14.8877)	(3.153)
Observations	800	800	282	282
NUTS2 Regions	150	150	56	56
Pairs	1916	1916	658	658

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap SE (B=199).
Honoré (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

There are significant differences between the coefficients in this table and the main tables (Table 3 and Table 4), which use pooled, rather than split samples, the first amongst them being the effect of GDP per capita on the ER vote, which once the sample is split becomes negative for Western Europe. That means that, in Western Europe, regions with higher GDP pc (log) are pushed away from the ER, and the positive coefficient in the pooled specification is driven by the Eastern European subsample, where support for the ER is concentrated in the more affluent regions. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the GDP per capita coefficient for the ER vote in the east is both positive and larger than its Western counterpart. The effect of the GDP per capita on the PRR vote, however, is a bit different. It is positive in Western Europe, but negative and considerably larger in absolute terms in Eastern Europe, which once again pulls the pooled specification coefficient in a way that is representative of one geographic sub-group but not the other. This is consistent with Lubbers et al. (2002), who find that in more prosperous regions, voters are more inclined to support the far right when they fear losing what they have gained. The pattern also resonates with Bustikova's (2014) account of the Eastern European radical right as fundamentally reactive: in regions where economic gains coexist with the political accommodation of ethnic minorities, the far-right vote can rise even as absolute material conditions improve.

Another attention-drawing finding is the new-found significance of the Gini coefficient, which was not previously a driver of the ER or the PRR vote in the baseline models of the pooled specification, but once the sample is split, becomes significant for the ER in Western Europe and the PRR in Eastern. It is likely that, because in each of the two groups gini is statistically significant for a different one of the two far-right subfamilies, when the sample is pooled, they cancel each other out. So, inequality activates the anti-systemic channel (which translates to ER vote) in the West, and the anti-elite channel (PRR vote) in the East.

While Gini gains significance, immigration loses it. Immigration flow is not statistically significant on either of the two far-right sub-families for Western Europe, but it is significant for the East. Much like in the other two cases, because the coefficients on the East are so much larger in absolute values than the West, it overpowers them, making the results of the main tables (Table 3 and Table 4) more representative of Eastern Europe.

The post-2015 dummy is significant for the PRR vote in both geographic sub-categories, but with opposite signs. In Western Europe, the dummy is negative, while in the East, it is large and positive. Comparing these to the pooled estimate in Table 5 makes clear that the positive pooled coefficient is driven entirely by the Eastern subsample, despite the Western pattern moving in the opposite direction.

The Western and Eastern experiences of the 2015 refugee crisis were, in fact, fundamentally different. In Western Europe, immigration flow is insignificant in the pre-2015 baseline but its interaction with the post-2015 dummy is positive and significant, meaning that immigration became a driver of PRR support in the West only after the crisis. This is consistent with the salience-of-change hypothesis (the crisis transformed immigration from a background condition into an active electoral mobiliser). In Eastern Europe, by contrast, immigration was already a strong baseline driver, and the post-2015 interaction is negative, indicating that the crisis did not introduce a new mechanism but attenuated an existing one.

The Eastern pre-2015 immigration coefficient is unusually large in magnitude and should be interpreted with caution. The Eastern subsample contains only 56 NUTS2 regions and 282 observations, with most of the within-region variation in immigration flows concentrated in a small number of countries. A coefficient of this size implies that even modest inflows translate into very large shifts in PRR support, which likely reflects the limited variation available for identification in the pre-2015 East rather than a structural feature of Eastern European politics. The direction of the effect is consistent with the broader pattern documented throughout this thesis, but the precise magnitude should not be over-interpreted.

For the ER, the post-2015 dummy is insignificant in both subsamples.

The Immigration Flow (%) x post2015 interaction adds further nuance to the results of the time split shown in Table 7. In the East, the interaction is negative for both the PRR and the ER, meaning that immigration, while remaining a strong baseline driver in Eastern Europe, became weaker after 2015. In the West, the picture splits by subfamily: the interaction is positive and significant for the PRR, meaning immigration became a driver of PRR voting only after the refugee crisis, and negative and significant for the ER, meaning it suppresses the ER vote after 2015. This is consistent with the interpretation that the refugee crisis channelled immigration-

related grievances in Western Europe toward the PRR rather than the ER, a pattern that, while impossible to confirm with aggregate level data, can be associated with voters shifting from the ER to the PRR. These findings align with the Salience-of-change hypothesis (Newman and Velez, 2014), whereby Eastern regions with low baseline immigration react disproportionately to small inflows (Georgiadou et al., 2018; Newman & Velez, 2014).

4.4 Marginal effects[7]

Marginal effects (ME) measure the change in the dependent variable based on a small change in one of the explanatory variables, while the others remain constant. The ME plots, therefore, show the point at which the effect becomes zero or changes sign.

While the interaction coefficients in Table 3 and Table 4 indicate the direction of the interaction, they do not reveal the full picture. The marginal effects plots below are used to show how the effects of the interaction terms on the far-right vote share change. Figure 3, for example, shows the point at which unemployment stops boosting PRR as immigration rises.




Figure 3: *Marginal effect of Unemployment Rate on PRR vote share, by Immigration Flow*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA and EU-NED electoral data.*

[7] Marginal effects are visualized following the recommendations of Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006)




Figure 4: *Marginal effect of Unemployment Rate on ER vote share, by Immigration Flow*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA and EU-NED electoral data.*




Figure 5: *Marginal effect of Immigration Flow on PRR vote share, by Unemployment Rate*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA and EU-NED electoral data.*




Figure 6: *Marginal effect of Immigration Flow on ER vote share, by Unemployment Rate*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA and EU-NED electoral data.*

According to Figure 3, for the PRR, the point estimate of unemployment's effect declines as immigration rises, though the interaction is not statistically significant, so this crowding-out pattern is only suggestive, while Figure 4 shows that unemployment's effect on ER strengthens as immigration rises, the opposite pattern. Figure 5 tells the same story as Figure 3 from the other direction: immigration's effect on PRR weakens at high unemployment, and Figure 6 shows that immigration's effect on ER strengthens at high unemployment.

The substantive asymmetry revealed by these plots has a clear theoretical basis. For the PRR, cultural threat operates as a standalone mobiliser: the PRR voter reacts to immigration as a perceived threat to national identity, independently of labour market conditions. When unemployment is low, this channel operates cleanly; as unemployment rises, the framing of grievance shifts from cultural to economic, and the immigration signal loses its mobilising power. For the ER, the mechanism is the opposite. Cultural threat alone is not sufficient; economic hardship is the precondition that activates the immigration response, consistent with group threat theory (Blumer, 1958), according to which immigration becomes politically salient as a threat to material resources rather than to identity. In the absence of labour market distress,

the ER voter is not mobilised by immigration; in its presence, immigration becomes the channel through which economic grievance is expressed.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In an attempt to understand the electoral evolution of the far-right in Europe, this thesis examines the demand-side determinants of both Extreme and Populist Radical Right voting across 271 NUTS2 regions in 27 European countries. This analysis distinguishes between Extreme Right (ER) and Populist Radical Right (PRR), employs the Honoré (1992) semiparametric panel Tobit fixed effects estimator to account for left censoring, and tests six hypotheses concerning the roles of economic insecurity, cultural backlash, their interaction, inequality, the 2015 refugee crisis and the Eastern-Western Europe asymmetry.

Regarding the PRR, the existing literature largely credits the rise in its demand to cultural backlash, with immigration operating as its primary measurable indicator, as cultural threat is not itself directly observable (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2007). This thesis' findings mostly confirm these expectations. This analysis has identified immigration flow as the dominant driver of the PRR vote, consistent across all specifications. Unemployment and inequality, despite appearing insignificant in the pooled sample, cannot be dismissed, as their effects become stronger in certain contexts, particularly after the geographic split, which reveals that inequality is in fact a driver for the PRR in Eastern Europe. In addition, the interaction term of unemployment and inequality is significant, meaning that while separately these two economic indicators fail to explain the rise in PRR support, when they are present simultaneously, they reinforce each other. This is consistent with the broader finding in the literature that economic and cultural insecurity are not independent forces but rather intertwined, with economic hardship amplifying the receptiveness to cultural threat (Swank and Betz, 2003; Gidron and Hall, 2017). It is also noteworthy, that robustness checks have confirmed that immigration flows have a much larger explanatory power than immigration stocks, in accordance with the Salience-of-change hypothesis (Newman and Velez, 2014).

The ER vote, on the other hand, is a completely different phenomenon, with completely different explanations, and the literature that distinguishes these parties as such, identifies them as being ideologically rooted in the fascist tradition (Mudde, 2007), and expects their electoral support to

be driven by economic insecurity. This thesis uses the unemployment rate as the main variable to measure economic insecurity, and finds it to be significant in all specifications. Immigration is, as expected, not a strong driver of the ER vote, much like inequality (Georgiadou et al., 2018; Golder, 2016).

It is already becoming apparent that the distinction between PRR and ER is necessary. A vote for the former is a reaction to a perceived threat to one's way of life, while a vote for the latter is a response to material deterioration and economic exclusion. The Extreme Right is smaller and far less electorally successful, its relationship to democracy being either strained or openly hostile (Mudde, 2007), while the Populist Radical Right has proven far more capable of mass mobilization, as it speaks the language of the ordinary citizen against the distant elite (Minkenberg, 2000).

These baseline findings, however, only tell part of the story. Keeping in mind that the data spans 27 countries with significant cultural and institutional differences, and 25 years during which Europe experienced a plethora of economic and political shocks, that changes the electoral landscape, it is essential to examine whether these relationships hold across time and space. They do not.

Having identified immigration as a primary driver of the far-right vote, particularly through the PRR, the 2015 refugee crisis represents a natural turning point that warrants separate examination. The structural break analysis, presented in Table 5 and Table 6, confirms that the crisis affected both the PRR and ER vote, though through distinct mechanisms.

Table 5 introduces the post-2015 dummy and its interaction with immigration flows. The level shift captured by the post-2015 dummy is positive and statistically significant for both party families, indicating a general rise in far-right support following the crisis. However, the interaction of immigration flows with the post-2015 dummy is negative for both PRR and ER, suggesting that the mobilizing effect of immigration on the far-right vote weakened after 2015. This attenuation is stronger for the ER than for the PRR, consistent with the broader finding that immigration is primarily a PRR driver. Table 6 extends the analysis by adding interaction terms for unemployment and inequality. The post-2015 coefficient for PRR remains large and highly significant, while for ER it loses significance once the additional interactions are included,

pointing to a PRR-concentrated level shift after the crisis. The Gini interaction for PRR turns negative after 2015, which may reflect a reshuffling of the inequality-sensitive vote toward other PRR-adjacent parties as the political landscape reconfigured around the migration issue.

The findings indicate that, post-2015, the far-right electorate underwent a shift in composition rather than a mere increase in size. The crisis appears to have boosted the PRR disproportionately, consistent with the salience-of-change hypothesis (Newman and Velez, 2014). Many voters who may previously have supported the ER on economic grievance grounds appear to have shifted toward the PRR, drawn by its more explicitly nativist framing of the crisis. This migration within the far-right bloc, rather than net gains from the political mainstream, partly explains why the immigration effect on the ER vote weakened post-2015 rather than strengthened.

Table 7 completes the picture by comparing the baseline coefficients directly across the two periods. For the PRR, the most striking change is the emergence of immigration flow as a statistically significant driver only after 2015, suggesting that the crisis transformed immigration from a background condition into an active electoral mobiliser in regions where it had previously lacked explanatory power. The Gini coefficient retains significance across both periods but weakens after 2015, consistent with the idea that the cultural shock of the crisis partly displaced inequality as a framing device for PRR rhetoric. For the ER, the changes are more fundamental. Immigration flow is positive and significant before 2015, but flips to negative and significant after, a sign reversal that is difficult to reconcile with a purely demand-side story of economic voting. Similarly, the Gini coefficient changes sign from positive to negative across the two periods. These reversals suggest that the 2015 crisis did not simply add a cultural dimension to the ER vote but actively restructured it, potentially by drawing culturally motivated voters out of the ER electorate and into the PRR, leaving behind a residual ER support base that is more purely driven by economic hardship and less responsive to immigration and inequality signals.

In addition to the time split, this thesis employs a geographical split, as shown in Table 8. The pooled sample masks two completely different stories. In the West, economic insecurity drives both subfamilies through conventional channels: unemployment pushes voters right, richer regions resist the ER. In the East, the economic mechanism runs through relative affluence and

inequality rather than labour market distress. Eastern far-right voters, particularly for the PRR, are not the unemployed poor but voters in unequal or relatively wealthier regions, consistent with relative deprivation rather than absolute deprivation. This pattern aligns with Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018), who show that radical right support intensifies precisely when economic hardship coexists with favorable aggregate-level conditions, with relative deprivation operating as the distinctive mechanism for the radical right rather than for the radical left. Immigration in the East is so dominant that it swamps the economic signals in the pooled specification entirely. The East teaches us that you do not need to be poor to vote far-right, you just need to feel like someone else is getting ahead at your expense.

Lastly, the marginal effects plots in Section 4.4 translate the interaction coefficients into substantive terms, revealing a fundamental asymmetry between the two party families in how economic and cultural drivers combine. The core message is that for the PRR, immigration and unemployment are substitutes (one crowds out the other), while for the ER they are complements (they amplify each other). This asymmetry is suggestive for the PRR, where the interaction is not statistically significant, and clearest for the ER, where it is.

Several limitations of this analysis should be noted. First, the regional level of aggregation precludes inference about individual voter behaviour: the relationships estimated here capture how regional conditions covary with regional vote shares, not how individuals respond to changes in their own circumstances. Second, the estimation sample is reduced to 1,082 observations from the full 1,573 due to missing values on socioeconomic covariates, primarily log GDP per capita, and this missingness may not be entirely random across regions. Third, this analysis is confined to demand-side mechanisms; supply-side factors such as party organisation, candidate quality, and coalition dynamics are not modelled, and their omission likely accounts for some of the residual within-region variation that the present specification cannot explain.

6. Policy Implications

6.1 Policy Simulations[8]

The following tables translate the Tobit coefficients into simulated effects on observed vote shares, starting from the median uncensored region (i.e. the median region among those with non-zero vote shares for that party family, for which the vote shares for the PRR and ER are 11.56% and 1.37% respectively). It should be noted that the shock sizes are not arbitrarily chosen but are estimated based on the distance from the median to the higher percentile of the observed data. For example, the median region in the sample has an unemployment rate of 7.3%, while the region at the 75th percentile has an unemployment rate of 11.0%. The difference between these two values (3.7 pp) defines the unemployment shock used in the simulations and represents what it means for a region to move from a typical level of unemployment to a clearly elevated one observed in the data.

Table 9: Simulated Effects of Key Drivers on Far Right Vote Shares

Shock	PRR effect	PRR new	PRR % change	ER effect	ER new	ER % change
Unemployment rate (+3.7 pp)	+0.87 pp	12.43%	+7.5%	+1.88 pp	3.25%	+137.2%
Gini coefficient (+2.7 pts)	+5.29 pp	16.85%	+45.8%	-0.82 pp	0.54%	-60.2%
Immigration flow (+0.22 pp)	+3.48 pp	15.04%	+30.1%	+1.11 pp	2.48%	+80.9%

Table 9 reports the simulated effects of realistic shocks in the three main drivers on PRR and ER vote shares. The unemployment shock raises PRR support from 11.56% to 12.43% and ER support from 1.37% to 3.25%. The Gini shock raises PRR support from 11.56% to 16.85% and reduces ER support from 1.37% to 0.54%. The immigration flow shock raises PRR support from 11.56% to 15.04% and ER support from 1.37% to 2.48%.

[8] Notes: Simulated effects use linear approximation y_new = y0 + beta x shock. Baseline y0 is the median region with non-zero vote share within each subgroup. Shock sizes computed from observed quantiles of the estimation sample: unemployment +3.7 pp (median to 75th pctile), Gini +2.7 pts (median to 80th pctile), immigration flow +0.22 pp (median to 75th pctile). Subgroup coefficients are constructed as the main coefficient plus the relevant interaction (East x driver or Post2015 x driver). Coefficients from Honore (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator, bootstrap SE (B=199).

Table 10: Simulated Immigration Effects, Eastern vs Western Europe

Shock	West PRR	East PRR	West ER	East ER
Baseline (median, uncensored)	8.31%	24.77%	1.20%	5.39%
Unemployment rate (+3.7 pp)	8.87% (+6.8%)	25.48% (+2.9%)	2.24% (+86.1%)	3.79% (-29.7%)
Gini coefficient (+2.7 pts)	8.95% (+7.8%)	32.70% (+32.0%)	2.49% (+107.1%)	9.84% (+82.6%)
Immigration flow (+0.22 pp)	10.38% (+24.9%)	33.62% (+35.7%)	0.92% (-23.1%)	10.74% (+99.4%)

Table 10 shows the simulated effects of the three main drivers on PRR and ER vote shares, separately for Western and Eastern European regions. A 0.22 percentage point increase in immigration flows raises PRR support in both Western and Eastern Europe (+24.9% and +35.7% respectively), but the effects on ER support diverge sharply: a decrease of 23.1% in the West against an increase of 99.4% in the East. This regional asymmetry, already discussed in Section 4, is striking: the effect of immigration flows on Extreme Right support in Eastern Europe is of a magnitude that clearly cannot be ignored. The unemployment shock produces the opposite asymmetry, with a strong PRR response confined to the West (+6.8% vs +2.9% in the East) and an even more pronounced effect on Western ER support (+86.1%) which actually reverses sign in the East (-29.7%). This pattern is consistent with the two-mechanism interpretation developed throughout the thesis, in which absolute material hardship operates as a driver of far-right support primarily in Western European regions. Inequality produces the most uniformly strong effects across regions, raising PRR support by 7.8% in the West and 32.0% in the East, and ER support by 107.1% and 82.6% respectively, indicating that the distributional channel operates broadly across both halves of the continent.

Table 11: Simulated Immigration Effects, Pre- vs Post-2015

Shock	Pre-2015 PRR	Post-2015 PRR	Pre-2015 ER	Post-2015 ER
Baseline (median, uncensored)	9.86%	13.46%	1.18%	4.66%
Unemployment rate (+3.7 pp)	10.40% (+5.4%)	15.29% (+13.5%)	2.31% (+94.9%)	7.21% (+54.7%)
Gini coefficient (+2.7 pts)	18.75% (+90.1%)	14.19% (+5.4%)	1.46% (+22.9%)	2.66% (-42.8%)
Immigration flow (+0.22 pp)	13.58% (+37.7%)	15.78% (+17.2%)	3.03% (+155.6%)	4.65% (-0.2%)

Finally, Table 11 simulates the same 0.22 pp immigration shock as Table 10, splitting the sample at the 2015 refugee crisis. The shock raises PRR support by 37.7% before 2015 and 17.2% after, while for the ER the pre/post contrast is dramatic: a 155.6% increase before 2015 collapses to

essentially zero (-0.2%) after. This is consistent with the structural break analysis in Section 4.2: by 2015 the ER had already absorbed its immigration-sensitive vote, leaving little room for further mobilization through this channel.

The simulated effects in Table 10 and Table 11 are constructed from the split-sample coefficients reported in Table 8 and Table 7 respectively, by combining the main coefficient with the relevant interaction term, rather than from a single pooled specification with interactions. It should also be noted that the percent changes for the ER vote share are computed from a low baseline (1.18% pre-2015, 1.37% in the pooled sample), and therefore appear large in proportional terms while remaining modest in absolute percentage points; the level changes ("from X% to Y%") are the more substantively meaningful comparison.

The split-sample analysis above documents that the relationship between immigration and far-right voting changed sharply across the 2015 refugee crisis, but it does not separate two distinct sources of this change. The post-2015 period combines higher average immigration flows with a different behavioural response to those flows. To distinguish between the two, an Oaxaca-type decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) is applied to the immigration channel, splitting the total post-2015 shift in far-right vote share into an endowment effect.

The standard formula of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition used in this thesis is:

$$\Delta \text{Vote} = \beta_{\text{pre}} \times (\text{Immigration}_{\text{post}} - \text{Immigration}_{\text{pre}}) + \text{Immigration}_{\text{post}} \times (\beta_{\text{post}} - \beta_{\text{pre}}) \quad (2)$$

The first term (i.e. $\beta_{\text{pre}} \times (\text{Immigration}_{\text{post}} - \text{Immigration}_{\text{pre}})$) captures the share of the change in vote share attributable to the change in conditions (immigration levels), while the second term (i.e. $\text{Immigration}_{\text{post}} \times (\beta_{\text{post}} - \beta_{\text{pre}})$) captures the share attributable to the structural break in the coefficient.

Table 12: Oaxaca-type Decomposition: Immigration Channel

	PRR	ER
Mean immigration flow (pre-2015)	0.6708	0.6708
Mean immigration flow (post-2015)	1.0510	1.0510
Endowment effect: β_pre × ΔImm	1.8916	2.7661
Coefficient effect: Imm_post × Δβ	6.7581	-11.5256
Total change attributable to immigration	8.6498	-8.7595
Endowment share (%)	21.9%	-31.6%
Coefficient share (%)	78.1%	131.6%

Decomposition of the change in far-right vote share attributable to immigration flow between pre- and post-2015 subsamples. Endowment effect = β_pre × (Imm_post − Imm_pre). Coefficient effect = Imm_post × (β_post − β_pre). Coefficients from Honoré (1992) Panel Tobit FE estimator.

The decomposition reveals that the post-2015 shift is driven primarily by changes in voter response rather than by changes in immigration levels. For the PRR, 78.1% of the +8.65 pp contribution comes from the coefficient effect, meaning that the cultural-threat response to immigration intensified after 2015 rather than simply being triggered by higher inflows. For the ER, the decomposition is more striking: while the endowment effect remains positive, the coefficient effect is large and negative, producing a net contribution of −8.76 pp. The 2015 crisis did not merely attenuate the link between immigration and ER support, it reversed it. Taken together, these findings reinforce the interpretation that the refugee crisis was less an exogenous increase in immigration levels than a moment that restructured the political meaning of immigration, activating the cultural-threat channel for the PRR while dismantling the economic-grievance interpretation that had previously linked immigration to ER support.

6.2 Immigration Management

The most consistent finding in this thesis is that immigration flows are the primary driver of far-right support, and that this effect operates through the pace and visibility of change rather than the accumulated presence of immigrant communities. Two implications follow, one for Western and one for Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe, the simulated effects in Table 10 show that immigration shocks raise PRR support but do not increase ER support. The mobilizing effect operates through the salience of

sudden inflows. A sudden concentration of arrivals in a small number of regions, such as the one that occurred during the 2015 refugee crisis, generates disproportionate political reactions even when aggregate national numbers remain modest. Policies aimed at distributing arrivals more evenly across regions and over time would therefore be more effective at dampening far-right mobilization than blanket restrictions on immigration volumes. Gradual and predictable inflows allow host communities the time to adjust, which reduces the cultural shock identified in this thesis as the primary trigger of far-right mobilization.

In Eastern Europe, the same logic does not hold. Table 10 shows that even a small immigration shock (+0.22 pp) raises Eastern ER support by 99.4%, and a refugee-crisis-style shock more than triples it. The sensitivity is so high that volume-management strategies alone are unlikely to neutralize it. The same flow that is politically manageable in the West produces a disproportionate reaction in the East. This points to a different policy priority: investing in the conditions that reduce baseline sensitivity to immigration, such as integration programs in regions that receive arrivals for the first time, public communication that frames inflows in concrete rather than abstract terms, and stronger institutional capacity at the regional level to manage arrivals visibly and competently.

The overarching policy lesson is that European immigration policy should not be treated as a single problem with a single solution. The same inflow generates different electoral consequences depending on regional context, and the appropriate response should be calibrated accordingly.

6.3 Labour Market Policy

Labour market policy's ability to reduce far-right support depends, according to this thesis' findings, primarily on where it is applied. Unemployment is a significant driver of far-right support in Western European regions for both the PRR and the ER, but is entirely insignificant in Eastern Europe, where the far-right vote operates primarily through cultural and distributional channels. This geographic asymmetry has a direct implication for the allocation of EU structural and cohesion funds: labour market interventions such as active employment programs, regional job creation schemes, and unemployment insurance are better targeted at Western European regions with persistently high unemployment, where they address the economic insecurity

channel most directly. Applying the same instruments uniformly across Europe risks misallocating resources toward Eastern regions where unemployment is not the binding constraint on far-right demand.

6.4 Inequality and Redistribution

The simulations in Table 9 show that a 2.7 increase in the Gini coefficient raises the PRR support by 45.8%, the largest simulated effect among the three drivers. This is consistent with the relative deprivation channel identified in this thesis, according to which, PRR voters respond to their position relative to others, rather than their absolute material positions. The same shock has the opposite sign for the Extreme Right, reducing ER support by 60.2%. This asymmetry reinforces the two-mechanism distinction that runs through this thesis. The PRR is mobilized by distributional comparisons, while the ER is mobilized by absolute material hardship, which is captured by unemployment and GDP per capita rather than by inequality measures. The policy implication is that inequality reduction suppresses PRR support unambiguously, but its effect on ER support is conditional on whether redistributive transfers also raise the absolute living standards of the regions where ER support concentrates. Redistribution financed through mechanisms that leave the bottom of the distribution materially unchanged would suppress PRR mobilization without addressing the ER channel.

Two policy instruments follow from this. The first is progressive taxation and transfer policy at the national level, which directly compresses the distribution that PRR voters respond to. The second is the structure of EU cohesion and structural funds, which already operate as cross-regional redistribution but are typically evaluated against growth and convergence benchmarks rather than against political stability outcomes. The findings here suggest that the political return on cohesion spending, measured by its capacity to suppress far-right mobilization, is an additional dimension that should enter the evaluation of these instruments.

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Appendix A

Table 13: Party Classification Table[9]

Country	Party	PRR	ER	Electoral Years	N Regions
Austria	FPÖ	✓		2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2019	9
	BZÖ	✓		2006, 2008, 2013	9
Belgium	VB	✓		2003, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019	11
	FNb	✓		2003, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019	11
Denmark	DF	✓		2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015	5
Finland	PS	✓		2003, 2007, 2011, 2015	4
France	FN/RN	✓		2002, 2007, 2012, 2017	14
	MPF	✓		2002, 2007	14
Germany	REP	✓		2002, 2005, 2009	38
	AfD	✓		2013, 2017	38
	NPD		✓	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	38
	DVU		✓	2002, 2005	38
Greece	LAOS	✓		2007, 2009, 2012	14
	ANEL	✓		2012, 2015, 2019	14
	Elliniki Lysi	✓		2019	14
	Golden Dawn		✓	2009, 2012, 2015, 2019	14
Italy	AN	✓		2001, 2006, 2008	21
	LN	✓		2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018	21
	FdI	✓		2013, 2018	21
	Fiamma Tricolore		✓	2001, 2006, 2008	21
	La Destra		✓	2008, 2013	21
	CasaPound		✓	2013, 2018	21
Netherlands	PVV	✓		2004, 2009, 2014, 2019	12
	LPF	✓		2004	12
	FvD	✓		2019	12
Norway	FrP	✓		2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017, 2021	7
Portugal	PNR	✓		2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015	8
	Chega	✓		2019, 2022, 2024	8
Spain	Vox	✓		2015, 2016, 2019, 2023	19
Sweden	SD	✓		2010, 2014, 2018, 2022	8
Switzerland	Lega dei Ticinesi	✓		2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2023	2
	MCG	✓		2023	2

[9] See list of Party Abbreviations in *Appendix*

Country	Party	PRR	ER	Electoral Years	N Regions
UK	UKIP	✓		2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017	37
	Brexit Party	✓		2019	37
	Reform UK	✓		2024	37
	BNP		✓	2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2019	37
Bulgaria	Ataka	✓		2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017	6
	VMRO-BND	✓		2009, 2014, 2017	6
	NFSB	✓		2014, 2017	6
	Vazrazhdane	✓		2021, 2022	6
Croatia	HDSSB	✓		2007, 2011, 2015	5
	DP	✓		2020	5
	Most	✓		2015, 2016, 2020	5
	HSP		✓	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2016	5
	A-HSP		✓	2011, 2015	5
Czech Republic	Úsvit	✓		2013	8
	SPD	✓		2017	8
	SPR-RSČ		✓	2002, 2010	8
	DSSS		✓	2013	8
Estonia	EKRE	✓		2015, 2019	1
Hungary	Fidesz-KDNP	✓		2010, 2014, 2018, 2022	9
	Jobbik	✓		2010, 2014, 2018	9
	FKGP	✓		2002, 2006	9
	MIÉP	✓		2002, 2006	9
	Mi Hazánk	✓		2022	9
Latvia	TB/LNNK	✓		2006, 2011	1
	NA	✓		2011, 2018, 2022	1
	KPV LV	✓		2018	1
Lithuania	TT	✓		2004, 2008, 2012	2
	LLL		✓	2000, 2004, 2008	2
	JL/LTS		✓	2000, 2004, 2008, 2012	2
Poland	PiS	✓		2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2023	17
	LPR	✓		2001, 2005	17
	Samoobrona	✓		2001, 2005, 2007	17
	Kukiz'15	✓		2015	17
	Konfederacja		✓	2019, 2023	17

Country	Party	PRR	ER	Electoral Years	N Regions
	KORWiN/KNP		✓	2015	17
Romania	PRM	✓		2000, 2004, 2012, 2016	9
Serbia	SRS		✓	2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2020	1
	Dveri		✓	2012, 2016, 2020	1
	Zavetnici		✓	2020	1
Slovakia	SNS	✓		2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2020	1
	Sme Rodina	✓		2016, 2020	1
	HZDS	✓		2002, 2006, 2010	1
	Kotleba-ĽSNS		✓	2010, 2012, 2016, 2020	1
Slovenia	SNS (SI)	✓		2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018	2
	SDS	✓		2004, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018	2
	N.Si	✓		2004, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018	2

Appendix B

Country	Abbreviation	Full Name
Austria	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
	BZÖ	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich
Belgium	VB	Vlaams Belang
	FNb	Front National (Belgium)
Denmark	DF	Dansk Folkeparti
Finland	PS	Perussuomalaiset
France	FN	Front National
	RN	Rassemblement National
	MPF	Mouvement pour la France
Germany	REP	Die Republikaner
	AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
	NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
	DVU	Deutsche Volksunion
Greece	LAOS	Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos
	ANEL	Anexartitoi Ellines
	Elliniki Lysi	Elliniki Lysi
	Golden Dawn	Chrysi Avgi
Italy	AN	Alleanza Nazionale
	LN	Lega Nord
	FdI	Fratelli d'Italia
	Fiamma Tricolore	Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore
	La Destra	La Destra
	CasaPound	CasaPound Italia
Netherlands	PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid
	LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
	FvD	Forum voor Democratie
Norway	FrP	Fremskrittspartiet
Portugal	PNR	Partido Nacional Renovador
	Chega	Chega!
Spain	Vox	Vox
Sweden	SD	Sverigedemokraterna
Switzerland	Lega dei Ticinesi	Lega dei Ticinesi

Country	Abbreviation	Full Name
	MCG	Mouvement Citoyens Genevois
UK	UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
	Brexit Party	Brexit Party
	Reform UK	Reform UK
	BNP	British National Party
Bulgaria	Ataka	Ataka
	VMRO-BND	Vatreshna Makedonska Revolyutsionna Organizatsiya - Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie
	NFSB	Naroden Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria
	Vazrazhdane	Vazrazhdane
Croatia	HDSSB	Hrvatski Demokratski Savez Slavonije i Baranje
	DP	Domovinski Pokret
	Most	Most Nezavisnih Lista
	HSP	Hrvatska Stranka Prava
	A-HSP	Autonomna Hrvatska Stranka Prava
Czech Republic	Úsvit	Úsvit Přímé Demokracie
	SPD	Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie
	SPR-RSČ	Sdružení pro Republiku - Republikánská Strana Československa
	DSSS	Dělnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti
Estonia	EKRE	Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond
Hungary	Fidesz-KDNP	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség / Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt
	Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom
	FKGP	Független Kisgazdapárt
	MIÉP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja
	Mi Hazánk	Mi Hazánk Mozgalom
Latvia	TB/LNNK	Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība
	NA	Nacionālā Apvienība
	KPV LV	Kam Pieder Valsts
Lithuania	TT	Tvarka ir Teisingumas
	LLL	Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga
	JL/LTS	Jaunoji Lietuva / Lietuvių Tautininkų Sąjunga
Poland	PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
	LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin
	Samoobrona	Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej

Country	Abbreviation	Full Name
	Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15
	Konfederacja	Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość
	KORWiN/KNP	Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja / Kongres Nowej Prawicy
Romania	PRM	Partidul România Mare
Serbia	SRS	Srpska Radikalna Stranka
	Dveri	Srpski Pokret Dveri
	Zavetnici	Srpski Pokret Zavetnici
Slovakia	SNS	Slovenská Národná Strana
	Sme Rodina	Sme Rodina
	HZDS	Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko
	Kotleba-ĽSNS	Kotleba - Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko
Slovenia	SNS (SI)	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka
	SDS	Slovenska Demokratska Stranka
	N.Si	Nova Slovenija - Krščanski Demokrati

Appendix C




***Figure 7**: Leave-one-out coefficients: Unemployment Rate on PRR vote share.*
***Source:** Author's calculations based on CLEA, EU-NED and Eurostat data.*




***Figure 8:** Leave-one-out coefficients: Immigration Flows on PRR vote share.*
***Source:** Author's calculations based on CLEA, EU-NED and Eurostat data.*




Figure 9: *Leave-one-out coefficients: Unemployment Rate on ER vote share*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA, EU-NED and Eurostat data.*




Figure 10: *Leave-one-out coefficients: Immigration Flows on ER vote share*
Source: *Author's calculations based on CLEA, EU-NED and Eurostat data.*

Appendix D

Acronym	Definition
CLEA	Constituency-Level Elections Archive
ER	Extreme Right
EU	European Union
EU-NED	European Parliament Election Database
FE	Fixed Effects
FR	Far Right
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HC1	Heteroskedasticity-Consistent (variance estimator, type 1)
LFE	Linear Fixed Effects
LTU	Long-Term Unemployment
ME	Marginal Effects
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
NUTS 2	NUTS, level 2
PopuList	The PopuList database (Rooduijn et al.)
PRR	Populist Radical Right
SE	Standard Error
Tobit	Tobin's probit (censored regression model)
pp	Percentage points