Xefteris, D., "Welfare Theorems for Democratic Politics"

Title: "Welfare Theorems for Democratic Politics"
co-authored with Jon Eguia (Michigan State University) and Glen Weyl (Microsoft)

Speaker: Professor Dimitrios Xefteris, University of Cyprus

Host:  Assistant Professor Efthymios Athanasiou, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Room:  76, Patission Str., Derigny Wing, 4th floor, Room D4.

Abstract: Markets decentralize private-good allocation and are disciplined by the welfare theorems. Democratic mechanisms decentralize collective choice but can select policy vectors that every citizen would prefer to reverse because ordinary voting ignores preference intensities. We study citizens who allocate nontradable voice credits across binary issues subject to concentration costs. Competitive political equilibrium exists. In large replicated societies, quadratic concentration costs make influence linear in primitive valuations and ensure asymptotic Pareto efficiency. They are uniquely capable of doing so: every other admissible separable cost, including every nonquadratic power cost, admits a robust economy converging to a Pareto-dominated policy. A political Second Welfare Theorem also holds. Any efficient policy that is unambiguously favored, issue by issue, by some positive weighting of citizens can be decentralized by redistributing voice credits. Welfare-theorem logic can therefore support democratic collective choice, as long as political power can shift across issues at the appropriate concentration cost.

Date: 
26/11/2026 - 15:30 to 16:45