Spring Semester 2023-2024

Title: "Threshold Regression in Heterogeneous Panel Data with Interactive Fixed Effects"

Speaker: Professor Yiannis Karavias, Brunel University London

Host:  Assistant Professor Alexopoulos Angelos, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Venue:  76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A36

Attachments:  PDF of Relevant Paper

Abstact: This paper introduces unit-specific heterogeneity in panel data threshold regression. Both slope coefficients and threshold parameters are allowed to vary by unit. The heterogeneous threshold parameters manifest via a unit-specific empirical quantile transformation of a common underlying threshold parameter which is estimated efficiently from the whole panel. In the errors, the unobserved heterogeneity of the panel takes the general form of interactive fixed effects. The newly introduced parameter heterogeneity has implications for model identification, estimation, interpretation, and asymptotic inference. The assumption of a shrinking threshold magnitude now implies shrinking heterogeneity and leads to faster estimator rates of convergence than previously encountered. The asymptotic theory for the proposed estimators is derived and Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate its usefulness in small samples. The new model is employed to examine the FeldsteinHorioka puzzle and it is found that the trade liberalization policies of the 80’s significantly impacted cross-country capital mobility

Title: "Output Dynamics and Private Sector Borrowing during Sovereign Debt Crises"

Speaker: Tamon Asonuma, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA

Host: Professor Evangelos Vassilatos, Head of the Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Venue:  76, Patission Str., Antoniadou Wing, 3rd floor, Room A32

Attachments:  PDF of Presentation

Abstract: Output dynamics and private sector access vary across sovereign debt restructurings with foreign private creditors. We compile data on sovereigns’ private sector borrowing from sovereign’ foreign creditor chair countries in 1977–2020. We find that (i) sovereigns with high private sector borrowing from sovereigns’ creditor chair countries choose a preemptive restructuring; (ii) private sector borrowing from sovereigns’ creditor chair countries declines mildly in preemptive restructurings while sharply in post-default restructurings. We build sovereign debt model with endogenous choice of preemptive and post-default renegotiations, output dynamics and private sector access. Our model quantitatively shows that the sovereign’s choice of preemptive or post-default restructuring affects differently the foreign creditor’s net worth and lending to the sovereign’s private sector, and, in turn, this results in different output dynamics. Data support theoretical predictions.

Title: "Electable and Stable Insiders’ Coalition Governments"

Speaker: Tryphon Kollintzas, Athens University of Economics and Business

Host: Assistant Professor Kospentaris Ioannis, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Venue: 2 Troias, Kimolou and Spetson Street, Room T101

Attachments:  PDF of Relevant Paper

Abstact: In this paper, we formulate a general equilibrium theory that explains the existence and stability of democratically elected governments that support certain groups of individuals in society (insiders) to the detriment of everybody else (outsiders), even if the latter constitute a majority. The vehicle is a dynamic general equilibrium model, where insiders get monopoly rents and outsiders get less than what they would have gotten under a common good regime. We construct such political economy equilibria and we identify the conditions under which such political regimes (coalitions of insiders): (a) can safeguard against opportunistic behavior (i.e., do not fall from within) and (b) may come to power in the first place (i.e., manage to get elected). To that end, we highlight the role of ideology or self-serving bias as a gluing device to garner an electable coalition.

Title: "The Role of Wages and Fringe Benefits in Job Search: Evidence from a Large-Scale Online Field Experiment"

Speaker: Assistant Professor Andreas Gulyas, University of Mannheim

Host: Assistant Professor Kospentaris Ioannis, Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business

Venue: 2 Troias, Kimolou and Spetson Street, Room T101