Ανάρτηση Ερευνητικoύ Δοκιμίου no 14/23

Ερευνητικό Δοκίμιο no 14/23 με τίτλο "Binary Public Decisions with a Status Quo: Undominated Mechanisms without Coercion" 
των Ευθ. Αθανασίου και Giacomo Valletta

Περίληψη
 

We discuss the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and that one of the two alternatives represents the status quo. We characterize the class of strategyproof and feasible mechanisms satisfying Voluntary Participation, that are not dominated by another strategy-proof and feasible mechanism. These mechanisms form a n-parameter innite family, the Unanimity mechanism is the only anonymous mechanism within this class.

Ο  Ευθύμιος Αθανασίου είναι Επίκουρος Καθηγητής στο Τμήμα Οικονομικής Επιστήμης του Οικονομικού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών και ο Giacomo Baletta είναι Associate Professor  στο EDHEC Business School.